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ABSTRACT 
 
Research and interest on terrorism has increased several folds in the last few decades       
in many countries. Terrorism is known to have a significant effect on security and socio- 
economic performance of  many  countries  across  the  globe.  This  paper  investigates  
the role of radicalization and recruitment of individuals into terror groups and terrorist 
activities. The paper uses theoretical analysis approach to examine secondary paper 
obtained from various secondary sources globally. The review uses qualitative methods 
comprised mainly of content analysis to identify mentions  of  relevant  terms  as  the 
main method. It then proposes possible prevention measures in the Kenya and Somalia 
context. The analysis has established that terrorism is a global phenomenon and has 
intensified especially since the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, 
Boko Haram, Al Shabab, and Islamic State. This paper shows that Al Shabab and Al 
Qaeda members including Kenyans have participated in several terrorist attacks globally. 
The paper finds that terrorist radicalization and recruitment mostly targets the youth 
through indoctrination based on extreme ideology, brainwashing; and rejection of status 
quo, freedom of expression, and modern ideas. A key finding is that contrary to belief 
linking terrorism to religion and ethnicity, empirical evidence indicates that economic 
circumstances top the list for individuals joining terrorist groups. The study concludes 
that radicalization and recruitment has increased tremendously in the recent past two 
decades. The study recommends that Kenya and Somalia governments should intensify 
credible intelligence gathering and response, build trust among ordinary citizens, improve 
on counter-intelligence, set up proper systems for de-radicalizing and resettling youth 
disengaging from terrorist activities, and institute measures for establishing livelihood 
engagements for all youth. The study also suggests that governments should deal with 
radicalization at grassroots level by including its causes, effects, and prevention in social 
studies starting from primary school level. 
 
Key Words: Al Shabab, Prevention, Radicalization, Recruitment,  Terrorism 
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1.0     INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s dynamic world characterized by globalization, freedom of movement, and 
sophisticated technology, importance of terrorism is manifest in the space it occupies in 
contemporary security literature (Cronin, 2004; Gerwehr & Daly, 2006; Botha & Abdille, 
2014). Terrorism  has been noted as a key concern for security and has been observed   
to lead to decline in social development of affected countries (Botha, 2014). It is further 
argued that economies of countries that experience high levels of terrorism will perform 
worse than those experiencing lower levels. Higher levels of terrorism deny countries an 
environment conducive for pursuit of opportunities and development agenda in a way 
that could make them prosper when not faced with terrorist threats. 
Terrorism refers to violence committed against a non-combatant target. It involves 
premeditation by clandestine agents or groups usually having  political  motives  and 
with the purpose of influencing an audience (Kimunguyi, 2011).Terrorism has become 
increasingly complex at international and national levels and existing mechanisms have 
been ineffective to deal with the associated problems conclusively. As a result, there has 
been an escalation of terrorist activities, especially in countries where security and entry 
restrictions are weak. These activities have had profound effect on social and economic 
performance of several countries through loss of innocent lives and livelihoods, destruction 
of property as well as restriction of freedom of movement (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). In 
addition, extant research portrays terrorism as a serious impediment and important factor 
for security and socio-economic activities in many economies (Botha,   2014). 
Many nationalities across the globe have recognized the need to deal with terrorism 
and this has resulted in concerted attention in analyzing terrorism, its manifestation, impact, 
and prevention (Botha & Abdille, 2014). For instance, the now famous September 2011 
(9/11) terrorist attack in the United States of America (USA) caused massive destruction 
of property, businesses, and deaths of over 3,000 people. Governments have changed 
tact and adopted a proactive approach to dealing with terrorism by allocating massive 
resources to enhance security even at the expense of socio-economic development. 
Although this has happened, the number of terrorist attacks and threats has not reduced 
in a significant way. In West Africa, Nigeria has experienced terror attacks for long and 
continues to face increased attacks from Boko Haram, a resident terrorist group whose 
insurgence permeates into Cameroun and other neighbouring West African countries. 
Similarly, East Africa region, Kenya in particular has experienced numerable terrorist 
attacks such as the 2015 Garissa University attack which left over 140 people dead is 
also documented in literature. 
Of all terrorism related concerns that worry the world today, few reach the level of 
radicalization (Odhiambo, 2015). Radicalization refers to the process by which people 
are made more willing to consider new and different policies and ideas including social 
and cultural beliefs. It is also the process by which an individual or group adopts extreme 
political opinions and religious beliefs. The 2012 Collins English Dictionary defines 
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radicalization as the social or religious ideals and aspirations that may reject or undermine 
the status quo or contemporary ideas and freedom of choice (Odhiambo, 2015). In the 
ongoing search for solutions for combating terrorism, and improving security, along a 
continuum of developing countries to world economic giants, the current period is full  
of many insights into radicalization (Kimunguyi, 2011). Extant studies have shown that 
radicalization can be an important antecedent for achieving the motives of terrorism 
(Ploch, 2012; Botha,  2014). 
A large array of new terrorists is initiated and created by radicalizing individuals 
increasing strengths of terrorist organizations. Through extreme political views and 
religious beliefs, a terror organization can obtain valuable competencies and resources 
which compliment their existing abilities. Through these dimensions, radicalization may 
drive terrorist organizations to become more aggressive in planning, coordinating, and 
executing their actions thus perpetrating terrorism. For instance, Sparago (2007) reports 
that, the now famous September (9/11) terrorist attack in the United States of America 
(USA) was planned, funded, and coordinated by Osama bin Laden from Al Qaeda base 
and training camp in Afghanistan. This was after moving from Sudan where he established 
valuable contacts with jihadists internationally whom he used to radicalize new Al Qaeda 
recruits. In similar circumstances, the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania respectively in which over 200 people died, were planned through sophisticated 
Al Qaeda networks beyond the borders of the two countries. 
Recruitment is an important determinant of terrorism (Kimunguyi, 2011). 
According to Homeland Security Institute (HSI), recruitment refers to the process by which 
people are enlisted to become members of an army or a cause (HSI, 2009). It involves 
methodically and intentionally targeting individuals to engage them into the activities of 
terrorist organizations or groups (Evans, 2007). Historically, the success of terrorists and 
insurgents has always been based on their ability to bring on board more recruits into 
their organizations. Studies argue that recruitment is an important source of manpower 
needed by terror organizations to launch attacks and sustain operations (Gerwehr & 
Daly, 2006). Due to the dynamic nature of terrorism, recruitment approaches change 
dramatically with intensity of terrorist or insurgent campaigns on the one hand, and 
proactivity or reaction by various state organs and security apparatus towards combating 
terrorism, on the other. 
This  is evident in the United Kingdom (UK) where a 2012 UK report indicates  
that terrorist recruiters have moved away from public places and are now targeting 
young educated people in private homes (Odhiambo, 2015). Similarly in Kenya, initially 
recruiters went for slum youths in the capital of Nairobi who were desperate and the city 
of Mombasa. However, the changed their approach as well as their targeted individuals. 
However, they have changed their tactics as well as their targets. Kenya’s National 
Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), reports that terror recruiters target university students 
who are well-educated and have penetrated universities and similar institutions through 
recruitment, training, and indoctrination thereafter (Daily Nation, June 29 2015). 
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The combined effect of radicalization and recruitment makes terrorism have both direct 
and indirect devastating consequence on economies worldwide. For example the direct 
costs associated with the September 9/11 USA terrorist attack include casualties, destroyed 
buildings, a heightened anxiety  level  and  the  estimated  80  to  90  billion  US  dollars 
in subsequent losses in wages, compensations, and decreased business (Kunreuther, 
Michel-Kerjan, & Porter, 2003; Chaliand & Blin, 2007). Other international terror attacks 
with huge social and economic implications include the Khobar Tower incident in Saudi 
Arabia in 1996; the Madrid, Spain bombing in 2004; and the England train bombing       
in 2005 (Kunreuther, et al.,  2003).  In West Africa,  Nigeria  has  experienced  terrorism 
for long which continues with intensified attacks from Boko Haram, a resident terrorist 
group whose insurgence permeates into Cameroun and other neighbouring West African 
countries. 
Literature has generally pointed to radicalization and recruitment as important 
antecedents of terrorism, although this is not adequately  supported  empirically.  
Apparently, some analysts  have  conceptualized  radicalization  and  recruitment  differently 
in terms of their dimensions and processes and therefore  effect  on  terrorism  (Botha,  
2014;  HSI,  2009;  Gerwehr  &  Daly,  2006).  By  merely   examining   these   relationships 
from a theoretical perspective, the actual effects and processes involved remain unclear. 
Furthermore, the lack of convergence in views  on  root  causes  of  terrorism  leaves  a  
cause for scholarly literature to establish more conclusive evidence on the actual factors 
leading to terrorism. This  calls for increased empirical research to investigate the nature   
and effect of radicalization and recruitment on terrorism. The main objective in this study 
was to establish the link between terrorism,  radicalization,  and  recruitment.  The  study  
also aimed to do determine measures that can be used to prevent radicalization and 
recruitment and thus reduce terrorism. The  study did a critical analysis of both empirical  
and theoretical literature to address the issue of how terrorist organizations and groups 
identify and recruit their members and the prevention, and counter-terrorism measures   
that can be used to reduce terrorist    activities. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are many theories that have been developed which try to explain the concept of 
terrorism as well as radicalization and recruitment as its antecedents (Schwartz, 2005; 
Moghaddam, 2005). However, we note that there is no single theory galvanizing all these 
concepts. This is perhaps because the field is still relatively young. Our analysis is thus 
underpinned on identity, socio-economic development, and “security threat” theories. 
Schwartz, Dunkel and Waterman (2009) conceptualized terrorism as an identity issue. 
Identity takes the form of a three dimensional theoretical construct comprised of cultural 
identity, social identify, and personal identity (Meloy, 2004; Schwartz, 2005; Moghaddam, 
2005). They argue that understanding terrorism requires not only studying the levels of 
the “main effects” of each identity but also the inherent “interactions” in these levels. 
Citing Schwartz, Montgomery, and Briones (2006), Shwartz Dunkel and Waterman 
(2009:540) refer to cultural identity as “the specific cultural values a person incorporates 
throughout life as guiding principles for behavior, such as collectivism, absolutism in 
belief, and familism.” This definition implies that terrorist engagement requires somebody 
to have stronger preference for cultural identity. Viewed from another perspective, cultural 
identity fuels terrorism through the dichotomous “us versus them” principle - for example 
our culture versus theirs, our religion versus theirs. Evidently, those who value cultural and 
social groups lower than themselves are less likely to spend personal time in advancing 
the agendas for such groups (Baum, 2008). Engagement in terrorist activities like suicide 
bombing thus calls for collectivism by prioritizing the group ahead of the   individual. 
Social identity theory also has many implications in the study of terrorism. The 
theory mainly deals with social aspects of the individual in terms of association with one’s 
own group and rejection of opposing groups (Wolf & Hulsizer, 2005). Social identification 
is acquired through diverse interpersonal relationships and interactions for example in 
high schools and religious activities such as prayers and seminars (Korostelina, 2008). At 
the social identity level, the dichotomous “us versus them” thinking promotes a sharp 
distinction between intergroup and intragroup relationships. Such distinctions encourage 
group members to vent their anger against groups they do not belong to. Clearly, terror 
organizations have taken advantage of such distinctions to perpetrate terrorism under 
the guise of Islam as a religious group distinct from Christians, Hindus, and others 
(Moghaddam, 2005). 
According to Schwartz et al (2009:544), personal identity refers to “individuals’ 
self-definition, particularly with respect to those goals, values, and beliefs that they hold 
in such domains of concern as vocation, religion, politics, family roles, gender roles, 
ethnicity, and personal interests.” They argue that the way personal identity is established 
explains its relevance to terrorism. Marcia (1966) conceptualized identity process as a 
paradigm consisting of exploration and commitment. During exploration, an individual 
actively considers alternative identity possibilities while in the commitment stage, he 
forms a strong, unwavering investment in the particular alternative identity elements 
preferred (McCauley, 1989; Waterman & Archer, 1990; Sanders, 1998). The outcomes 
from this paradigm lead to emergence of terrorist identity. 
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In search for solutions for prevention of terrorism, studies have also analyzed 
terrorism based on several disciplines such as security, economics, sociology, peace, and 
conflict (Omer, 2009; Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). Two primary theoretical perspectives have 
emerged from these studies; one viewing terrorism as a socio-economic development 
issue, and the other as a security threat (Omer, 2009). The socio-economic development 
approach to radicalization has focused on the social and economic development as key 
issues to democratization (Omer, 2009). Researchers taking this approach have considered 
educational and economic empowerment as the best prescription for radicalization. 
Their argument is that because poverty and illiteracy combine to form an environment 
conducive for radicalism, socio-economic development can be used to reduce or even 
eliminate radicalization (Richards, 2002). The use of social and  economic  measures  
have facilitated a multi-level approach to analysis of radicalization including national, 
regional, global, and organizational or group  levels. 
The other school of thought on terrorism research stems from security threat 
perspective (Omer, 2009). Analysts using this perspective have argued that poverty and 
lack of education do not seem to characterize most terrorists (Rice, 2003). In their view, 
it seems that most terrorists are more from ordinary backgrounds and of middle class 
status. As such terrorism is more predominantly a security threat with no socio-economic 
linkage or root. Literature focusing on this approach has laid more emphasis on coercive 
action, jihadist ideology, state actors, and counter-terrorism intelligence (Barro, 2002; 
Giorno, 2002; Krueger, Alan, and Jitka Maleckova, 2003). While this security approach 
promises to make a strong contribution, some studies have questioned validity of research 
stream (Botha & Abdille, 2014). Furthermore, lack of consensus on the actual nature of 
jihadist ideology, and coercive action has created confusion. Even with these differences, 
studying radicalization still remains important and provides a great potential for future 
contribution to counter-terrorism and prevention measures. 
 
Terrorism, Radicalization, and Recruitment in  Kenya 
Kenya has been a hotbed for terror activities especially in the last nearly three decades 
or so. Kenya shares international borders with five countries including Ethiopia, South 
Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia. Majority of these countries have historically 
experienced internal violent conflicts to varying degrees some of which are still active. 
Furthermore, the shared borders are porous and uncontrolled making free movement a 
regular phenomenon (Kimunguyi,  2011). 
Kenya’s constitution also guarantees its citizens and other residents freedom of 
speech, movement, and other rights. These issues coupled with technological factors such 
as internet, mobile phones, and social media expose the country to terrorism. As a result 
there has been a significant increase in terror attacks in Kenya over the past few decades. 
Literature has linked these increased terrorist incidents to the region’s vulnerability 
arising from conflicts which the region particularly Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Djibouti has been experiencing (Ibrahim, 2010; Rabasa et. al.,   2007). 
The significant increase in terror attacks in the region has further been fueled by 
conflicts at both internal and inter-interstate levels coupled with weak governance, and 
statelessness in Somalia. Porous borders characterized by free movement of people and 
illegal small arms and light weapons (SALWs) have also enabled terrorists to significantly 
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penetrate deeper into various neighbouring countries in the region (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 
2009; Rabasa, 2009). This has been most harmful especially along the Kenya-Somalia 
border and has not only aided refugees fleeing the conflict to move freely into Kenya but 
also easy movement of terrorists and smuggling of SALWs into the country (Menkhaus, 
2005).Vulnerability in the region may further be linked to radical Islam in the Horn of 
Africa (Kimunguyi, 2011). The region has experienced an escalation in the number of 
radical Islamist groups and movements for a long time. This upsurge may  be associated 
with  the poor socio-economic conditions in the region which Islamist fundamentalist 
groups take advantage of to penetrate the region (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009). While 
seemingly well intentioned, humanitarian assistance and support towards development, 
and social services such as education, healthcare, and vocational training have also been 
used for proliferation of extremism in the region. 
In the last two decades or so, Kenya has experienced a phenomenal increase in 
number and intensity of terror attacks compared to all its neighbours except Somalia 
(Kimunguyi, 2011). These include those mentioned earlier and the 2002  Kikambala  
Hotel incident, the 2013 Westgate Mall attack which killed over 65 people, the 2015 
Garissa University attack in which over 140 people died, and more recently the 2016 El 
Ade Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) camp in Somalia in which unknown number of soldiers 
were killed. The escalation in numbers and seriousness of the attacks has aroused the 
concern of the Kenya Government and the internal  community. 
Initially, attacks in this country were mainly carried out by non-Kenyans. For 
example the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in which over  
200 people died. However, as the frequency and complexity of the attacks increased it has 
been realized that Kenyan’s are also involved. Odhiambo (2015) lists several examples 
including the March 2012 Nairobi bus park grenade attack by a 28 year-old Kenyan 
named Elgiva Oliacha Bwire alias Mohammed Seif; Nderitu also known as Mohammed; 
Muchiri, alias Hussein; Paul Wangaga and his wife who were shot dead after throwing 
three grenades at police officers; Abraham Kemoi Setot; and Caleb Anyela Onyango who 
police arrested in Kitale in July 2012 while on a self confessed mission allegedly to bomb 
a Catholic Church in Umoja in    Nairobi. 
As a result of the increased intensity of attacks across the globe, there has been 
increasing international focus and attention on counter-terrorism and prevention measures 
which has pushed many countries to be concerned with global terrorism. This is more so 
because radicalization and recruitment of individuals by terrorists happens in all corners 
of the globe including the internet (Arena & Arrigo, 2006). At national level, governments 
have formulated relevant policies, created systems and structures, and even enacted 
specific laws to deal with terrorism. This makes terrorism a complex and important issue 
which begs the question: “How do terrorist organizations and groups identify and recruit 
their members; and what are the prevention, and counter-terrorism measures that can be 
used to reduce terrorist activities?” 
 
Radicalization of Individuals 
Radicalization is a key initial step towards terrorism comprised of indoctrination, 
brainwashing, isolation, extreme ideology, rejection of status quo, and denial of freedom 
of expression. Several past studies have gradually contributed to the establishment of 
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radicalization as a legitimate construct contributing to terrorism (Botha & Abdille, 2014; 
Kimunguyi, 2011). Prior to these studies, radicalization was viewed not so much from 
extremist perspective but more as a normal phenomenon involving different views and 
opinions of politics, policies and ideas. Much of this body of literature has been synthesized 
by for example Odhiambo (2015) and Omer (2009) as they made comparisons between 
radicalized and non-radicalized individuals. In these studies, several aspects of terrorist 
organizations were indentified. The identified characteristics include higher affinity for 
social groups, cultural inclination, religious beliefs, collectivism, and fundamentalism 
(Omer, 2009). In contrast, non-radicalized people were categorized as having lower 
affinity for these attributes. 
Research has been relatively uniform in application of radicalization but differences 
have arisen in researcher perceptions of the construct. This is evident in the diverse 
definitions of radicalization in more contemporary literature. For example radicalization 
has been viewed as adoption of extremist belief system as method to support societal 
changes (HSI, 2009). In contrast, it is viewed as social or religious ideals and aspirations 
that may reject or undermine status quo (Odhiambo, 2015). Even with this diversity in 
definitions, determining radicalization has surprisingly remained fairly consistent with 
majority of authors using brainwashing, indoctrination, rejection of status quo, financial 
assistance promise and familial-like bonds as its measures (HSI, 2009; Shwartz, Dunkel,  
& Waterman, 2009). It seems more contemporary literature has increasingly regarded 
radicalization as a precursor to terrorism. Radicalization is closely linked to recruitment 
and in Kenya, the two take place almost simultaneously. 
 
Recruitment into Terror Groups 
Maintaining the right number and type of people has become increasingly important for 
terrorist organizations. Studies (Sparago, 2007; HSI, 2009) indicate that in this era where 
terrorism has become a global affair, every terrorist organization strives to be able to 
meet future demands for its activities. Recruitment increases the likelihood that terrorist 
organizations will realize their short and long-term obligations. As terrorist organizations 
continue to intensify their operations through search and retention, they are using a 
holistic approach to talent management. 
The role of recruitment is that of identifying, attracting, and indoctrinating new 
members into a terrorist organization (Botha, 2014; Botha & Abdille, 2014). Recruitment 
has been mentioned in several extant studies as a crucial step in ensuring continuity in 
terrorist activities (Odhiambo, 2015; Kimunguyi, 2009). Terrorism is a dynamic venture 
with very high attrition rates and hence requires a constant replenishment of personnel 
and physical resources and assets. Research indicates that many countries spend colossal 
amounts of resources in terrorism detection and prevention measures and hence terrorists 
have to keep changing their tactics to succeed (Home Department, 2011). It has also 
been established that modern terrorism involves suicidal approaches which results in 
high attrition in terms of loss of terrorist human resource. For example, terrorist operations 
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have lost several personnel during suicide missions such as 1998 Kenya and Tanzania USA 
Embassy bombings, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA, and many more in Somalia. 
This makes recruitment an important activity for terrorist organizations to ensure they not 
only have adequate resources but also new personnel and ideas to execute their plans. 
Due to the importance of recruitment in terror organizations, considerable 
amount of research attention has focused on its role in terrorism (Botha, 2014; Botha & 
Abdille, 2014; Odhiambo, 2015). This research has however concentrated more on how 
recruitment is carried out leaving out conceptual issues (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006; Sparago, 
2007; HSI, 2009). This is demonstrated in the many different approaches to recruitment 
discussed in literature. For example Sparago (2007) discusses religion, sex, age, marital 
status, economic background, and level of education as the most important demographic 
characteristics terror recruiters give priority. The article argues that being a Muslim tops 
the priority list of recruiters and supersedes all other factors. The article also observes 
that recruitment largely targets males which supports the fact that more than 90% of 
past attack cases have involved male terrorists. Another important characteristic is being 
young – for example 9/11 attackers were in 28-33 year old bracket. 
In Kenya, radicalization and recruitment target people with similar demographics 
and characteristics. A significant factor is religion which available reports indicate that 
the preferred recruits either have to be of Muslim faith at the onset or have to convert 
to Islam before joining a terror group (Odhiambo, 2015). The group of people most 
predominantly targeted is the males although there have been few reports of female 
recruits. For example intelligence reports indicate that three Kenya females were arrested 
in 2015 on the way to Somalia to join Al Shabab. Reports further indicate that much as  
Al Shabab has been recruiting mainly youth across the board, their main target in the last 
few years has been the youth in schools, tertiary institutions, and universities. According 
to intelligence reports, at least one terrorist involved in the 2015 Garissa University attack 
was university student. Likewise, more recently in 2016, a university student was arrested 
at the airport while on his way to Libya to join a terror  group. 
These terror incidents have increased against a backdrop of intense recruitment 
drives resulting from Al-Shabaab’s agents which have shown tremendous success. 
Especially, the continued occupation of Somalia by Kenyan fighters has led to tremendous 
increase of new individuals’ recruitment from Kenya, of Somalis and non-Somalis 
resulting in a wider outreach. A factor which has been linked to increased intensity       
of recruitment in Kenya is the presence by Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in Southern 
Somalia. It is noted that Al Shabab attacks involving Kenyans has increased significantly 
from 2011 when KDF invaded Southern Somalia. Reports by The East African Standard 
newspaper of November 5, 2015 indicate that Al-Shabaab, is actively recruiting from 
neighboring Kenya as retaliation for this occupation to prepare them to fight within and 
outside Somalia. Obviously this trend means that reducing impact of al-Shabab within 
Somalia and Kenya will be more   difficult. 
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According to Botha and Abdille (2014), religious and economic gains top the list of 
reasons why individuals join Al Shabab. In their empirical study in Mogadishu Somalia, 
they found that young people are easily lured into terrorism by being offered money, 
jobs, and opportunities. In Somalia, such offers are for as little as $50  a month (Botha   
& Abdille, 5) while in Kenya  they are much higher including for example a monthly 
salary of $700, their family upkeep, and benefits of spiritual and economic nature. 
Similarly, terrorist recruiters argue from a Muslim religion point of view to make their 
targets believe that after their deaths during jihad, they get automatic ticket to heaven 
and will enter paradise directly where 72 virgins will greet them (Kohlmann, 2006). This 
idea that one may go straightly to paradise is of great inspiration of terrorists since one 
is made to believe in better life after death compared to the one he lives. Moreover, this 
becomes more convincing when they see many of the dead ones celebrated as martyrs 
where they live. For example congratulating the parents by naming streets after them and 
designating holidays in their honour and sacrifice. Terrorists engaged in suicide missions 
tend to achieve a cult-like status of celebrity in some parts of the Muslim dominated 
world. This allures those intending to become famous. This can be a great opportunity to 
those desperate for opportunities for success and earning a living. Jihad can be viewed as 
a means towards self-fulfillment through selfless action. 
Recruitments take place in specific places which terrorist recruiters perceive as 
safe, private and not exposed to arouse suspicion (Botha, 2014). Mosque environment is 
one such place which provides the individual with converging structure of socialization 
and religion (Botha & Abdille, 2014). The recruits view the mosques as religious symbols 
used to for practicing faith, prying and interacting with other faithful. According to Forest 
(2006), Mosques are places where Muslims pray together and interact and therefore offer 
an atmosphere of privacy  that makes it easy for individuals operating in the mosque    
to perform recruitment and radicalization rituals without much suspicion. Forest (2006) 
further argues that for recruiters, the mosque acts as an ideal place where possible recruits 
can be identified. In the mosques, worshippers are observed and based on how they 
behave and the extent of their vulnerability, the recruiters are able to detect who can be 
a good target to be recruited. 
The  Internet has also proven to be one of the most powerful and useful tools    
of terrorism as a communication tool, an educational forum, and of course a place       
for recruitment (Laqueur, 2004;  HSI,  2009;  Odhiambo,  2015).  The  virtual  approach  
to recruitment enables the targeted individuals have extreme identity confidentiality 
making tracking their movement difficult. The Internet being borderless therefore makes 
a good and limitless recruitment place globally (Kimunguyi, 2007). It is now possible for 
somebody in Kenya, to communicate and establish a jihadist network far away in Somalia 
or Afghanistan and seal a deal in minutes. In Kenyan context much as many youth has 
been netted from all corners of the country, many of them are from regions hail from 
predominantly Muslim regions especially in the north eastern territory of the country 
(NSIS, 2015). 
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Reports indicate that the militant group has taken advantage of the Kenyan recruits and 
put online propaganda videos featuring fighters speaking Kiswahili Kenyan accent to 
convince potential recruits of existence of Kenyans in the group (Ringa, 2015). Kohlmann 
(2006) states that different types of video tapes have been used in the past for attracting 
vulnerable individuals to terrorism. These video tapes include testimonials of past martyrs 
together with executions, and even scenes of people being beheaded. They also contain 
messages delivered by bin Laden and Zawahiri. These tapes and messages  in  other 
forms mostly propaganda are easily available and can be readily accessed through the 
internet. Most often, they are popularly displayed in schools, mosques and such places 
where groups of youth can be easily reached. The main motive is to access these targets 
personally and individually. It is believed that when they see accomplishments of the 
others with their own eyes, this can powerfully motivate terror recruits. For example, 
when American Nicholas Berg’s execution is shown in videos, the potential terrorist sees 
with his own eyes jihadism in practice and where he should place his   obligations. 
Some of the prime breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment are educational 
institutions like schools and universities. In particular, the lower education levels tend   
to be better targets since many students are still young and are easily impressed. In the 
madrasa and lower primary schools, young people in the 8 - 10 years age bracket are 
taught early to obey religious authority without question. Because the madrasa system 
educates many young children, it acts as incubation apparatus for recruiting candidates. 
Other institutions of higher learning such as universities are increasingly being used as 
hunting grounds by those recruiting terrorist (Odhiambo, 2015). June 29, 2015 Daily 
Nation reports attributed to Kenya National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) indicate 
that well-educated university students are easily lured by the militants to the group by 
penetrating institutions of higher learning where they recruit, indoctrinate, and even train 
their recruits. Easy access to these institutions has been blamed on the government’s 
poor monitoring system which has made it possible for terrorist agents to easily enter the 
institutions and perform their intentions unnoticed. 
In April 2015, Kenyan security agencies learnt firsthand the impact of educated 
Kenyan recruits after it was revealed that one of the Garissa University College attackers 
was a university law graduate. The former University of Nairobi (UON) law student 
Abdirahim Mohammad Abdullahi who was behind the attack was killed during an 
operation to retake the university. According to April 25, 2015 issue of Kenya Today, 
Abdullah who was a Mandera chief’s privileged son having graduated with a law degree 
in 2013 was working as a bank advisor before later joined Al-Shabaab. It is said that    
the second known university graduate to have died while fighting for al-shabaab. This 
followed the previous death of the first university student who died while carrying out    
a suicide bomb attack at a police station in 2014 in Nairobi. Abdul Hajira, the suicide 
bomber reappeared to complete a bachelor of commerce degree after a one year absence. 
Most students recruited into al-shabaab such as Abdullahi went through the mentorship 
of an engineer Sheikh Ahmad Imam Ali who was declared the supreme leader of al- 
shabaab’s Kenyan branch. It has also been reported that the video production unit of 
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al-shabaab is headed by one of previous Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture (JKUAT) 
student, Ali (Wardheernews 2015, December 14). Ali operates from a base in Somalia 
since 2009, and is believed to adopt a recruitment strategy that targets both students 
and the deprived people in places like Nairobi’s  Majengo slums. Street children in the  
12 and 16 year age bracket living in the coastal area are also targeted by people like Ali. 
Most of the children fall prey to these recruitments mainly because they lack basic needs 
including food, clothing, and even housing which the al-shabaab suggests would give to 
those who return to their fold. Reports also indicate that recruits gain in terms of family, 
belonging and purpose (Botha, 2014; HSI, 2009; Daily Nation 2015, November 1). 
In August 2015, those responsible for recruiting Kenyans into al-Shabaab were 
identified by  security agencies to include Ali himself, Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, A 
and Abdifatah Abubakar Ahmad. It was confirmed that the two were leaders of Jeshi la 
Ayman  (‘Army  of Ayman’), which was started by Al Shabab militant wing with the aim  
of increasing terrorist attacks in the Kenyan Soil. They have since participated in a few 
incidents in the Kenyan coast (Roberts, 2015). Terror groups also in addition have targeted 
prisons in Kenya which Cuthbertson (2004) says are prime areas to recruit individuals 
from Pistole (2003). He further adds that, this is so because prison inmates often turn to 
religion during their confinement. 
This results in a situation where the confined youth get exposed to Islamic 
extremism. Often, the prisoners convicted of petty offences such as drug selling, illegal 
alien, and theft harbour feelings making them prone to extremists. As soon as they are 
nabbed, such individuals take to terrorist activities as a way of revenging to the society 
that denied him freedom sending him to prison. Islam prisoners are likely to adopt the 
type of frustrations that other Muslims all over the world suffer. They feel that whereas 
one society jails them, the other welcomes them. The problem of recruiting inmates will 
prevail in Kenya  since they are neglected by  family and friends. Becoming a member   
of these radical groups protect and provide the incarcerated individuals with a network 
for communicating within and outside the prison walls. Studies focusing on terrorism 
have reported mixed findings. While Botha and Abdille (2014) indicate that terrorism 
and radicalization may be related, Odhiambo (2015) shows that in some cases, some 
individuals are recruited  into  terrorism  without  being  radicalization.  Similarly,  there 
is interchangeable use of radicalization and recruitment of individuals into terrorism 
causing confusion. There is also a dearth of studies on measures to prevent terrorism. 
These differences show lack of convergence in opinions about terrorism, radicalization, 
recruitment, and prevention. This paper addressed these gaps in line with the conceptual 
framework in Figure 2.1. 
 
Conceptual Framework for the Study 
The reviewed literature has revealed that gaps still exist in this important area of 
radicalization, and recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups. Despite terrorist 
activities increasing considerably in Kenya in the last few decades, the link between 
radicalization, recruitment, and terrorism is still unclear especially regarding the  specific 
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methods terrorists use to recruit individuals. Also missing are the methods that can be 
used to prevent further radicalization and recruitment. This study attempted to fill these 
gaps by investigating the relationships as shown in Figure  2.1 
 
Independent variable Intervening variable Dependent variable 
 
 
Figure 2.1- Conceptual framework for the study. 
 
 
3.0    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This article used qualitative research design to do a theoretical analysis of extant 
literature on radicalization, and recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups. The main 
aim of the study was to determine if radicalization and recruitment leads to increased 
terrorist activities and identify methods to reduce radicalization. The study was a desk 
analysis of existing academic literature and obtained journal articles, books, periodicals, 
publications, and conference papers from various sources. The study also applied content 
analysis techniques to identify, analyze, and critique authors’ discussions and opinions  
on terrorism. 
 
4.0 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTION OF 
TERRORISM 
The purpose of this study was to determine how terrorist organizations and groups 
identify and recruit their members. We predicted that radicalization and recruitment 
had increased globally especially in Kenya and this has led to many young Kenyans  
joining terrorist organizations. According to this article, terrorism has become a global 
phenomenon devoid of physical boundaries. This is evident from the high number of 
terrorist incidents in USA, Europe, Middle East, Northern and West Africa. There has also 
been a sharp increase in terrorist activities in the East African region, Kenya in particular 
following the 1998 USA embassy bombing which has been associated with Al Shabab 
working together with Al Qaeda. Thereafter, terrorists have targeted Kenya with several 
attacks in Kikambala, Westgate Mall, the 2015 Garissa University, and the January 2016  
El Adde KDF attack inside   Somalia. 
The study also aimed to establish prevention, and counter-terrorism measures that 
can reduce recruitment. We proposed that prevention efforts should focus on places of 
worship, educational institutions, and internet among many of which have become hotbeds 
Recruitment Radicalization Increased Terrorist 
Activities 
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for terrorist radicalization and recruitment. This article found that terrorist recruiters target 
mainly mosques, schools, social establishments, internet, and universities. Terrorist groups 
operate under the guise of specific religious ideology but often interpret it to justify their 
extremist cause. No wonder in Kenya, a growing trend for terrorist recruiters is to first 
convert their victims to Islam before indoctrinating them into terrorist activities. 
Globally terrorism prevention has focused on reducing environments that are 
conducive to terrorist activities. For instance the UN counter terrorism strategy of 2006 
recommends an approach that aims to address conditions that promote the spread of 
terrorism. Likewise, studies (HSI, 2009) have suggested measures such as legislation to 
criminalize radicalization and recruitment, especially children, into terrorism; increased 
monitoring of websites appealing to targeted population and create other websites 
which act as “noise” or decoys aimed at redirecting attention of the targeted people.  
This article finds that in order to reduce radicalization and recruitment of Kenyans by 
terrorist organizations, the Kenya Government, international community, and academic 
institutions have roles to play. 
The Kenya government can involve religious and community leaders more in the 
fight against terrorism. This  is consistent with Botha and Abdille (2014) who pointed  
out the need to support an inclusive national building process by bringing clan leaders 
together at regional and national levels. Odhiambo (2015) also argued that the inability 
of the Muslim community to confront radicalism is due to lack of Kenyan-Muslim 
leadership commitment. Forming regional and national forums will also resolve the 
alleged lack of a common voice of Muslim leaders in condemning acts of terrorism,    
and their apparent silence when Islamic institutions and places of worship are allegedly 
used for radicalisation. By creating such forums for the leaders, the government will 
address the capacity gaps among individual imams to enable them becoming proactive 
in detecting radicalization activities in the  mosques. 
Capacity building may be in form of training on modern and effective strategies to 
combat radicalism, and provision of security, so they can speak out openly, especially in 
places of worship, against the indoctrination of the Muslim youths (Okeyo & Abdiwahab, 
2014). The government should also work on building trust with the communities. The 
government should show the public that it is able to offer better life than what the terrorists 
promise –“winning the heart of the minds”. Building trust can also include controlled 
use of force during anti-terrorism raids. Quite often, anti-terrorism raids are conducted 
with little or care for the local bona fide residents. These raids should be conducted in 
ways that do not harm the Kenyan citizens living in these areas such that only insurgents/ 
terrorists are targeted. 
The  government also needs to enhance intelligence gathering and use. It is clear    
that terrorist strength is vested on its ability to gather intelligence. According to Kimunguyi 
(2011), lack of adequate intelligence reduces ability of the government to plan counter- 
terrorism  strategies.  Kenya’s  security  agencies  should  gather  intelligence  at  the  levels  
of  school,  places  of  worship,  community,   and  public  places  in  general.  Moreover     the 
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intelligence gathered should be acted upon. It has also been reported in the past that there 
is sometimes collusion between some members of the security forces and terrorists such 
that information is leaked to terrorists making them evade arrests. Counter-terrorism need 
to combine prevention approaches to address both real and perceived grievances as well 
as economic, social and political issues; and should also involve gathering intelligence 
within security agencies such as police force, NSIS, and the armed forces to know in 
advance if some staff could be in touch with terrorists (Rosand, Ipe, Miller, 2007:  103). 
Furthermore it is ironical that in Kenya, security officers are often deployed in 
areas where they do not understand the local language, culture, or geographical terrain. 
This often leads to ineffectiveness in intelligence gathering and discharge of duties, and 
sometimes devastating consequences such as the Baragoi Massacre of 2012, where 42 
newly graduated police officers lost their lives pursuing cattle rustlers in a jungle they did 
not understand. To effectively combat radicalism and its effects, the Government needs a 
review of policy, to ensure that a good proportion of postings in areas prone to terrorism 
for purposes of intelligence gathering understand the culture and language of the local 
communities where there is perceived radicalization (Stockman,  2006). 
In most cases, local administrators get insights into happenings within their 
localities, and would be key partners in intelligence gathering on the activities of radical 
groups, and individuals suspected of involvement in such activities. These administrators 
would be important agents in identifying candidates for the de-radicalisation programme, 
to forestall the recruitment and radicalisation process, as well as in the rehabilitation of 
returnees from al Shabaab. Training and adequate security would be required to build 
the capacities of local administrators to play these roles more effectively. These initiatives 
should be in addition to the Nyumba Kumi initiative which should also be strengthened 
through legislation, establishment of structures, and capacity building. 
The government also needs to establish a program for reintegration and counter- 
radicalization of returnees who delink with terror organizations. It is not evident from 
the analysis how former radicalized people who surrender are accepted and reintegrated 
back into normal life. Returnees, majority of whom return after disengagement from 
radicalised groups due to disillusionment that they have experienced in the field, could 
prove useful if rehabilitated to dissuade others from supporting al Shabaab. Such parties 
could be embedded into peer education programmes in schools and colleges to give 
them better understanding of the dynamics of radical and terrorist groups. An example 
is in Somalia where the government has set up a re-integration program to rehabilitate 
and resettle ex-Al Shabab combatants back into the society (Okeyo & Abdiwahab, 2014). 
There is also need to increase awareness campaigns to sensitize the communities 
on radicalization, and educate the citizens and other Kenya residents on dangers of 
radicalization and joining terror groups. This could be done through several media 
channels, updating curriculum to include anti-terrorism issues, but even more importantly 
to educate on the known channels such internet and other methods. This can promote 
patriotism, and sensitise the communities on what actually radicalisation is, and what  it 
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is not, as well as the consequences of radicalisation, and alternative and peaceful ways 
of achieving the ends for which radical groups  recruit. 
An important aspect of the message would be to educate the audiences on the need 
for unity as Kenyans, as well as how to identify and respond to radical teachings, and how 
to identify and handle radicalised persons within the community (Botha, 2014). Message 
should be tailored according to target beneficiaries. For example some groups would 
include madrassa teachers, parents, teachers in formal education - primary, secondary 
and colleges/universities; and the students themselves (Botha, 2014). Furthermore, there 
is need to establish a nation-building process that is inclusive by creating opportunities 
for national dialogues bringing together clan leaders at regional and national levels to 
debate issues of radicalization, recruitment, and terrorism and make recommendations 
for implementation. 
Sensitizing and creating awareness to Journalists on patriotic reporting on Terrorism 
may also reduce radicalization. Terrorists rely on the power of the media - electronic, print, 
and online - to carry the message about their activities (Awal, Hoskins, & O’Loughlin, 
2011). Unaware of this fact, many local journalists and media houses have played into 
the terrorists trap, and contributed to the spread of fear and mutual suspicion between 
communities and religions. While media houses have  a role to report objectively on     
all occurrences, training the media to report on attacks considering national interests, 
security and cohesion, as international media does when such attacks happen in the 
west, would to a large extent help to focus the public attention and reaction to the real 
issues, without resulting to ethnic and religious profiling - which is the terrorists’ main 
purpose  (Aziz, 2010). 
The Kenya government can also improve efficiency of the judiciary and strengthen 
the criminal justice system as a measure for reduced terrorist activities. Many law 
enforcement officers lament the inadequacies of Kenya’s judicial system in handling 
terrorism cases (The Equal Rights Trust, 2012). It is not uncommon for an officer to risk 
his life apprehending high profile suspects, only for the suspects to be set free on bond, 
pending hearing of the case. In some cases, the suspects have returned to harm or kill the 
arresting officers, and then escape out of the country, thus absconding the court bond. To 
Quote Al Amin Kimathi, a renowned Muslim human rights crusader, “They [police] reach 
a point where they get frustrated by the law and the court process and they have realized 
that the only way to deal with these people is to ‘disappear’ them” (Jamah, 2015). The 
government should strengthen the rule of law and criminal justice system to ensure fast 
and thorough investigations are done on terrorism cases. This should enable cases of 
terrorism to be dealt with conclusively and expeditiously. The conceptual framework in 
Figure 4.1 summarizes these recommendations in a diagrammatic form. 
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Independent variable Intervening variable Dependent variable 
 
 
Figure 4.1- Recommended conceptual framework from the study findings 
 
Radicalization was operationalized as  extreme  ideology,  brainwashing,  and  rejection 
of status quo, denial freedom of expression and modern ideas while recruitment was 
determined by promises for compensation, good life, isolation, and being given guns and 
money. 
5.0     CONCLUSION 
 
This article analyzed the nature of terrorism in Kenya specifically focusing on radicalization 
and recruitment of people into terrorist groups. We did a critical literature review of both 
empirical and theoretical studies as well as  other  research  reports. The  analysis  reveals 
that whereas terrorism is a global phenomenon, the increased terrorist activities in Kenya 
may be attributed to a number of specific factors including the country’s proximity to 
Somalia where Al Shabab is resident and very active; lack of adequate control  and  
corruption at entry points into the country which  facilitates  entry  of  illegal  aliens  who 
later on engage in terrorism, and illegal weapons later on used in perpetrating terrorism   
and  other  criminal  activities;  historical  injustices  in  some  areas  and  communities  in   
the country which drive their youth and other members to  rebel  against  the  laws  and 
reject the status quo; failure by government to create an environment conducive for 
entrepreneurship, social development, and business opportunities to ensure youth are 
actively engaged in lawful and gainful activities; failure to create a system for monitoring  
and gathering intelligence from schools, places  of  worship,  social  places,  communities  
and the public at large which may be used to plan counter-terrorism and prevention 
measures  and  preempt  radicalization  and  recruitment  and attacks. 
Granted, these are not the only means through which the war on radicalisation 
can be won. However, the bottom-line remains that it is possible to defeat radicalisation 
and its effects, including terrorism. As we have seen in this discourse, the key   approach 
Prevention 
Radicalization Recruitment Increased Terrorist 
Activities 
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lies in responding to the ideology that results in violent extremism with a higher level of 
calmness, and tact, as opposed to fighting fire with fire. 
 
6.0     RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study recommends that the Kenya government should take immediate interventions 
to prevent radicalization in the country. These should involve use of professional 
psychologists and religious leaders to identify an individual’s motivations for joining a 
radical group, or using the already existing information and then developing a solution 
based on the individual’s motivations. Medium term interventions should include 
information and sensitisation campaigns to help people understand radicalisation, and 
what to do about it. Addressing systemic issues and historical injustices, which have been 
used to give legitimacy to the radicalisation course, would be long term strategies. These 
would ensure that the gains made through small incremental processes under immediate 
and short-term strategies are solidified, and effective systems are put in place to forestall 
radicalisation before it starts. The study finally recommends that future research may 
focus on establishing more specifically why learned youth tend to succumb more to 
radicalization. 
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Limited. Dr. Okeyo has been the Lead Consultant in many projects for example in  UNESCO,  UNDP,  
UNICEF,  Oxfam,  CHF  International,  and  USAID. 
 
Dr.  Okeyo is currently the Deputy Vice-Chancellor in charge of Academic Research, and Extension and   
also the PhD Coordinator at the Management University of Africa. He has led research and organizational 
development projects in several corners of the globe, including serving as the research programme 
manager for an Africa-wide UNESCO funded research project. He has had study and academic tours in 
many countries in Africa, Europe, and USA. He has written and published widely in Entrepreneurship, 
Management, and Leadership. He has published in many peer reviewed journals including European 
Scientific Journal, Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, International Journal of Business and 
Social Research, and others. He is a member of the Editorial Board of International Journal of Management 
and Leadership Studies. Dr. Okeyo is also a current member of the Governing Council, Management Board, 
and the Senate of the Management University of Africa; and Chairman of the University’s School Board, 
and Deans, Library, Curriculum Development, Student Disciplinary, Conference Planning, Procurement, 
and Graduation Committees. 
 
Dr. Okeyo served in the boards of and is a current full member of Muthaiga Golf Club, Parklands Sports 
Club, and Nyanza Club. He recently attended the Leadership and Management Summit, and UNCTAD      
14 World Investment Forum both held in Nairobi in 2016. He is a current Full Member of Kenya Institute  
of Management and has assessed performance of many CEOs and a wide cross-section of multi-sectoral 
businesses and organizations in Kenya under the KIM’s Organizational Performance Index (OPI) and 
Company of the Year  (COYA)  initiatives. 
 
PROFILE 
International Journal of Management and 
Leadership Studies 
Copyright@ International Journal of Management and Leadership Studies [IJMLS] 
2 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdi, BA, MPhil, 
MA 
Mr. Abdiwahab Sheikh is a Director & Senior  Consultant. 
 
bdi has over eighteen years of experience, spent in employment and in 
consultancy. Mr. Abdi worked in senior positions in both private and public 
sectors in Kenya and South Africa. From 1999 to date, he has over eight 
years experience as a research consultant in conflict management. He 
started work in 1992 as a Geography and History teacher in Wajir High 
School (North Eastern Province of Kenya). During this period, his specific  
responsibilities in the    school included; head of the geography department, chairman of the disciplinary 
committee and head of guidance and counseling. In 1993, Abdi was employed by UNICEF as a human 
resource manager. He resigned in 1994, and worked with Ibrahim Al Ibrahim Foundation, another non-
governmental organization, as the District Relief Coordinator. In 1995, Abdi briefly resumed his teaching 
profession at Upperhill Secondary School in Nairobi as a Geography teacher before proceeding to Uganda 
for further studies at the Uganda based  Islamic University. 
Mr. Abdi also worked as Managing Director of Flower Petroleum Product in 1999. Between 2004 and 2005, 
Abdi pursued his Masters Degree in Conflict Management at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in 
South Africa. In 2005, he became an assistant lecturer in the same university and fellow researcher at Africa 
Institute of South Africa, one of the biggest research institutes in the Southern Hemisphere. From 2005 to 
date, Abdi has been engaged in consultancy in various fields including peace and conflict management. 
In 2009, Abdiwahab completed his second masters’ degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies  at the 
University of Nairobi. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies and        the same 
University. In addition to consultancy work, Abdi also doubles up as a part-time lecturer in the department 
of History at the Kenyatta University. 
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